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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, corporation takeovers became popular 
in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, there are few empirical 
studies concerning takeovers in Hong Kong. This study, 
using data for the period between 1985 and 1991, 
investigates Hong Kong takeovers and tests their impact on 
stock returns of the bidding firms. The results show that 
bidding firms earn significant gain from takeovers. It 
suggests that the hypothesis that no daily abnormal returns 
for the bidding firms around the time of announcement 
cannot be rejected. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE 
Introduction 
In recent years, takeover activities have spread over 
the world, particularly in major financial centres such as 
the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. In late 
198 0s, corporation takeovers became popular in Hong Kong. 
Between 1986 and 1992, a total of 141 takeover bids were 
launched among listed companies in Hong Kong, with 97.8% of 
these bids successful. 
More companies are willing to take over other business 
in order to take potential gains such as synergies and 
diversification, monopoly power, elimination of inferior 
management and financial synergies. 
Takeovers can occur through merger, tender offers, or 
proxy contests, and sometimes a combination of the three. 
Both tender offers and merger proposals involve offer 
to purchase the targets' shares at a price above the pre-
proposal market price. 
A merger occurs when two firms combine their 
operations, the result being that only one firm exists. 
Moreover, mergers usually are negotiated by the management 
of the two firms. Thus, the merger proposal must be 
approved by the board of directors of the target firm which 
then puts the proposal to a stockholder vote. 
\ 
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In tender offers, the management of the bidder makes 
a direct appeal to the shareholders of the target firm for 
their shares. The target and bidding firms will still 
exist after tender offers. Tender offers can be friendly 
or hostile. Friendly tender offers refer to offers that 
are supported by the target management. Hostile tender 
offers refer to offers that are opposed by the target 
management. 
A proxy contest occurs when an insurgent group, often 
led by a dissatisfied former manager or a large 
stockholder, attempts to gain controlling seats on the 
board of directors. 
While many research on the United States and United 
Kingdom takeovers have been carried out previously, 
empirical research on takeovers in Hong Kong is missing in 
the literature. Research on takeovers has generally shown 
that corporate takeovers generate substantial abnormal 
returns to the shareholders of the target firms. However, 
previous evidence suggests that the abnormal returns to 
successful bidding firms in tender offers are positive and 
in mergers are zero. In sum, recent studies show that the 
impact of takeovers on the shareholders of a bidding firm 
is mixed. 
Obiective 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the 
impact of takeovers on the stock returns of bidding firms. 
It is expected that this study will provide a deeper 
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insight into the stock price movements of bidding firms 
around takeover announcement in the Hong Kong stock market. 
We hoped that our study will be helpful to investors, 
managers and other participating bodies in takeovers 





Rationale for Takeovers 
There are many reasons for takeovers. In fact, there 
may be more than one reason involved in a particular 
incidence of takeover activity. In this section, the 
current theories concerning takeovers will be discussed. 
Generally, these theories are classified into two 
mainstreams. The first category of theories try to explain 
the takeover phenomenon from the shareholders' standpoint. 
These theories include efficiency theories, 
diversification, market power theory, financial motivations 
and undervalued target theory. Another group of theories, 
on the other hand, investigate the takeover phenomenon 
using theory of agency problem. 
From the shareholders' standpoint 
Efficiency theories 
Under the differential theory, if the management of a 
firm is more efficient than the management of another firm, 
and if the former acquires the latter, the efficiency of 
the acquired firm is brought up to the level of efficiency 
of the acquiring firm. Efficiency is increased by 
takeover. 
The inefficiency management theory implies that the 
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management of the target firm is not performing up to its 
potential. Assets of a target firm can be managed more 
effectively by the better performing bidding firm and 
therefore this provides a rationale for takeovers. 
Efficiency theories also include the possibility of 
achieving some form of synergy. A takeover can achieve 
"synergy" by combining two firms. The idea is to 
concentrate a greater volume of activity into given 
resources. Synergies could occur through realization of 
economies of scale, vertical integration, adoption of more 
efficient production or organizational technology, 
increased utilization of the bidder's management team, and 
reduction of agency costs by bringing organization—specific 
assets under common ownership [Chandler (1962, 1977), 
Williamson (1975, 1981), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982)] • 
Diversification 
Company can diversify its business into different, 
unrelated kinds of business in order to obtain greater 
stability on earnings through spreading activities in 
different industries with different business cycles or to 
diversify out of a static or sunset industry. However, the 
free cash flows theory claims that diversification programs 
will generate lower total gains in takeovers [Jensen 
(1986)]. Jensen states that "in declining industries, 
mergers within the industry are likely to be low- or even 
negative-return projects^. ” Details of free cash flows 
1 M. C. Jensen, 1988, 329. 
\ 
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theory will be discussed later. Therefore, if a company is 
engaged in takeover for the sake of diversification, it is 
doubtful if the bidding firm will benefit from the 
takeover. 
Market power theory 
Acquiring competitors is the easiest way for a firm to 
obtain an increase in market share of an industry. The 
market power hypothesis implies that mergers increase 
product prices thereby benefiting the merging firms and 
other competing firms in the industry. However, Stillmen 
(1983) and Eckbo (1983), which use the equity price changes 
of firms that compete in product markets with the merged 
target to reject the hypothesis that takeovers create 
market power^. 
Financial motivations 
Financial motivations for acquisitions include the use 
of underutilized tax shields, avoidance of bankruptcy 
costs, increased leverage, and other types of tax 
advantages. For instance, an acquiring firm can substitute 
its capital gains taxes for ordinary income taxes by-
acquiring a growth firm with a small or no dividend payout 
and then selling it to realize capital gains. However, 
most recent studies says that tax benefit is not a major 
reason for takeovers^. 
2 Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 20-21. 
3 Jarrell, Brickley, Netter, 1988, 56. 
7 
Undervalued target theory 
The theory states that because a target is undervalued 
by the market and therefore a bidder can offer substantial 
premiums for the target firm while still paying below its 
intrinsic value. However, Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 
opposes to this argument and claims that "if undervaluation 
of target had indeed been present, then the deluge of new 
information on the intrinsic value of targets should have 
caused fundamental price corrections even in the event of 
takeover defeats. But in the overwhelming majority of 
cases studied, prices dropped rather than increased for 
target firms that fought off takeovers^. 
From the managers' standpoint 
Agency problems 
Agency problems arise because managers own only a 
fraction of the shares of a firm. This may lead managers 
to work less efficiently or to consume more perquisites 
because the majority owners bear most of the cost. In 
large corporations the individual shareholders with small 
holdings do not have sufficient incentive or resources to 
monitor effectively the activities of managers. 
The agency problem of takeovers has two aspects. The 
threat of takeover by a firm is a monitoring device that 
will cause the managers to act more closely with the 
shareholders' interests. Alternatively, takeovers may be 
a result of the agency problem rather than the solution. 




The managerialism theory argues that takeovers take 
place to increase the size of a bidding firm because the 
compensation of a manager is often based on the size of the 
firm [Mueller 1969] . However, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) 
finds that a manager's compensation is significantly 
correlated with the firm's profit rate but not the sales of 
the firm. Thus, Mueller's argument is doubtful. 
Hubris hypothesis 
Roll (1986) argued that, on average, takeovers involve 
a transfer of wealth from shareholders of bidding firms to 
shareholders of target firms. Hubris hypothesis is the 
explanation for the takeover phenomenon provided by Roll. 
Hubris is a Greek word meaning "animal spirits," with 
connotations of excess pride. Hubris hypothesis says that 
bidders infected by hubris simply pay too much over their 
target and transfers virtually all potential takeover 
premium to the target shareholders. This phenomenon 
describing an acquiring firm's overbidding for its target 
is called "winner's curse". 
Free cash flows theory 
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required 
to fund all projects that have positive net present values 
when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Jensen 
(1988) states that managers endowed with free cash flow 
will invest it in negative net present value projects 
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rather than pay it out to shareholders. He argues that 
management perquisites increase with investments in 
operations even when these investments have a negative net 
present value. Agency problems arise and acquisitions are 
a means of spending cash instead of paying it out to 
shareholders. Therefore, the theory implies that managers 
of firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash 
flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or even 
value-destroying takeovers and diversification programs 
generally fit with this category. 
Hubris hypothesis is consistent with free cash flows 
hypothesis because management of a firm with large free 
cash flows is more likely to be infected by hubris and 
engage in value decreasing takeovers. In sum, Roll (1986) 
and Jensen (1986) support that takeover is a manifestation 
of agency problem i.e. managers act against shareholders' 
interests and overpay for the targets. 
Empirical Literature Review 
Overview 
Numerous studies have been done to find out the 
effects of various takeover activities on the stock prices 
of the participating firms around the time of announcement 
of takeover proposals. Early event studies of takeover, 
including Mandelker (1974) , Ellert (1976) and Langtieg 
(1978), analyze the effect around the effective date of 
merger which is the date of final approval by target 
shareholders. However, according to Dodd (1977) , accurate 
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estimation of the market response to mergers requires use 
of the date of the first public announcement of the 
proposal. Typically a public announcement of negotiations 
and proposed terms is made well before the date of final 
approval. It is this earlier date that is of critical 
importance in studying market reactions. By the date of 
final approval of the takeover, much of the information of 
the merger has been released. Thus, our study will focus 
on the review of event studies of takeovers followed by 
Dodd (1977). 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarizes the results of the 
studies in the 1970,s and the early 1 9 8 0 I n tables 1 & 
2, Jensen & Ruback summarize stock price changes (net of 
market price movement) for both bidding and target firms 
for successful and unsuccessful takeovers in these studies. 
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Table 1 
Abnormal percentage stock price changes associated with 
successful corporate takeovers 
Takeover technique Targets (%) Bidders (%) 
Tender offers 30 4 
Mergers 20 0 
Proxy contests 8 not applicable 
Source: M. C. Jensen, and R. S. Ruback (1983), “ The 
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence", 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
a. Abnormal price changes are price changes adjusted 
to eliminate the effects of marketwise price changes. 
Table 2 . • 
Abnormal percentage stock price changes associated with 
unsuccessful corporate takeover bids.'' 
Takeover technique Targets (%) Bidders (%) 
Tender offers -3 -1 
Mergers -5 ‘ 
Proxy contests 8 not applicable 
Source: M. C. Jensen, and R. S. Ruback (1983), “ The 
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence", 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
a. Abnormal price changes are price changes adjusted 
to eliminate the effects of marketwise price changes. 
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Table 1 shows that target firms earn significant 
positive abnormal stock price changes of 20% in mergers and 
30% in tender offers. Bidder firms of successful tender 
offers earn a statistically significantly positive average 
abnormal returns of 4% an zero in mergers. Table 2 shows 
that both targets and bidders suffer small negative 
abnormal stock price changes in unsuccessful mergers and 
tender offers. In the followings, the stockholders' 
returns of both target and bidding firms, in which takeover 
event is arranged by tender offers and mergers, will be 
discussed in details. 
Target Firm Stockholder Returns 
Successful target returns 
Past studies support that shareholders of target firm 
benefits from takeovers. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987a) finds 
that target firms of successful tender offers earn an 
average of 19 percent in the 1960s, 35 percent in the 
1970s, and 30 percent for the period between 1980 to 1985. 
The result is consistent with the 13 studies of pre-1980 
data contained in Jensen & Ruback (1983) which agrees that 
targets of successful tender offers and mergers before 1980 
earned positive and significant abnormal returns (See table 
1 ) • 
Unsuccessful target returns 
Targets of unsuccessful tender offers earn a 
significantly positive weighted average abnormal returns of 
13 
35.2% on the offer announcement. However, targets of 
unsuccessful tender offers that do not receive additional 
offers in the next two years lose all previous takeover 
premiums. Targets of unsuccessful mergers earn a weighted 
average one-month abnormal returns of 17.2%. However, 
targets of unsuccessful mergers earn a negative of -2.9% 
which is estimated from the initial announcement through 
the outcome date. Therefore, all the announcement gains 
are lost by the time failure of the offer becomes known 
[Jensen & Ruback (1983)]. 
Bidding Firm Stockholder Returns 
Successful bidder returns 
There is empirical evidence that corporate 
acquisitions by tender offers provide significant and 
positive abnormal returns to the stockholders of both 七he 
target and the acquiring firm [Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Bradley (1980), and Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982)]. 
However, empirical research on mergers has found that 
bidding firms pay large premiums for target firms. Dodd 
(1980), Firth (1980), and Varaiya (1985) find that 
shareholders of bidding firms lose a small significant 
amount from the announcement of a merger bid. Asquith 
(1983) finds that bidding firm shares show "no consistent 
pattern" around the announcement date, but "in summary, 
bidding firms appear to have small but insignificant 
positive excess returns at the press day^.” 
5 Asquith P, 1983, 66. 
\ 
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Jensen and Ruback interpret the articles and conclude 
that "in brief, the evidence seems to indicate that 
corporate takeovers generate gains, that target firm 
shareholders benefits, and that bidding firm shareholders 
do not lose\ “ However, in a review of more recent 
research, Jarrell and Poulsen (1987a) finds an apparent 
secular decline in the gains to successful bidders in 
tender offers. Table 3 summarizes the result of Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1987a). 
Table 3 
Cumulative excess returns to successful bidders for 
tender offers during 1960 to 1985, by decade. 
Trading day All 1960s 1970s 1980s 
interval I 
-10 to +5 1.14a 4.40 1.22 -1.10 
(t-stat.) (2.49) (4.02) (2.12) (-1.54) 
-10 to +20 2.04 4.95 2.21 -0.04 
(t-stat.) (3.31) (3.52) (2.87) (-0.04) 
Number of 405 106 140 159 
observations J| I I I 
Source: Jarrell and Poulsen, Working paper, 1987a. 
a. cumulative excess returns in percent 
The results of table 3 is consistent with the previous 
studies reviewed by Jensen & Ruback (1983). The cumulative 
excess returns to successful bidders for tender offers are 
statistically significantly positive during 1960s and 
1970s. But the results from the 1980's show statistically 
6 Jensen and Ruback, 1983, 47. 
\ 
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insignificant losses to bidders. Jarrell, Brickley and 
Netter (1988) conclude that acquirers "receive at best 
modest increases in their stock price, and the winners of 
bidding contests suffer stock-price declines as often as 
they do gains?." 
Unsuccessful bidder returns 
In a review of the studies before 1983, bidders earn 
a weighted average abnormal returns of -1% in tender offers 
and -5% in mergers around the takeover announcement (See 
table 2)• Jensen & Ruback (1983) also contains results on 
stock returns of bidding firms around the termination 
announcements for unsuccessful acquisition attempts and 
reports generally positive bidder returns. 







This research covers a period from January 1985 to 
December 1991. The information about takeovers are 
obtained from the Fact Books published by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (Fact Books 1983-1992), and 
the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly. The details of the 
announcements of these takeovers have been confirmed or 
corrected from 七he daily posts. The announcement date 
refers to the first date when information disclosed with 
certainty in the stock market. There are 147 acquisitions 
for the period from 1986 to 1992 and only six of which are 
mergers (See Appendix 1)• In this study, we will focus on 
successful tender offers. 
To be included in our initial sample, the tender 
offers must meet the following criteria: 
(i) It is a successful tender offer. 
(ii) Bidding firm has a listing status on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange before the takeover announcement. 
Thirty three tender offers satisfy these criteria. 
The daily stock returns were obtained from the PACAP. 
The following two criteria were applied in screening 
out the final sample. 
\ 
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(i) Bidding firms must not engage in other takeover and 
merger activities in the three months prior to an 
other announcement day. 
(ii) Bidding firms must have trading on more than half of 
the trading days between the estimation period -130 to 
-30 days. 
The first criterion is to reduce the noise created by 
other corporate events on stock returns. The second 
criterion makes sure that we have enough data in estimating 
parameters of the market model. 
The final sample consists of thirty one bidding firms 
which have engaged in successful tender offers between the 
period from 1986 to 1991 (See Appendix 2) • 
Hypothesis To Be Tested 
Daily abnormal returns for the bidding firms around 
the announcement date is zero. 
Methodology 
The hypothesis examined will be tested by applying 
event-study methodology. The objective of event study is 
to assess whether there are any abnormal or excess returns 
earned by shareholders accompanying specific events. In 
the past, event studies have been conducted to investigate 
the announcement effects of mergers and acquisitions e.g. 
Jensen & Ruback (1983). 
In this study, a market model is used to estimate the 
normal return of the security that would have been achieved 
\ 
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without the event. 
The daily normal returns for a sample of N firms are 
calculated by: 
Rit = + 吼 u + 
where 
a, B are parameters of the OLS regression; 
R.^  is the rate of return on the ordinary shares 
of firm i for day t 
R^it is the market rate of return for day t 
eit is the disturbance term of firm i for day t 
]3iR„�t captures the "systematic" shocks which have an 
impact on all stocks in the market. On the other hand, 
captures the "idiosyncratic" shocks comprising those 
factors specific to individual stocks. The random error, 
ei口 has a mean of zero and is uncorrelated with Rj^ . 
Two market returns are obtained from the PACAP. 
Therefore, two data sets are prepared. One data set will 
use the value-weighted market return with cash dividend 
reinvested as the market return. Another data set will use 
the equally weighted average market return with cash 
dividends reinvested as the market return. Then, ordinary 
least squares coefficients of the market model regression 
using different market returns are estimated over the 
period from t二-13 0 to t=-31 relative to the date of the 
initial announcement date, t=0. 
\ 
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For each firm, a total of 100 days before the takeover 
event period is used to estimate the parameters of the 
market model; the event period itself is defined to be from 
30 days before to 3 0 days after the announcement day. 
That is, 
Estimation period Event period 
< X > 
* * * * 
一 1 3 0 -30 0 30 days 
The estimated abnormal returns of firm i during the 
event period (Aiy is the difference between the estimated 
normal returns and the observed returns: 
A A 
A R , == RIT - (Q^I + 帆 U ) � 
where 
A A 
a and 3 are best linear estimates taken from the 
data. 
The cross-section average abnormal return (AARJ is 
calculated by 
AAR, = 1/N S ARj, (2) i=l 
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARJ is 
calculated by 
CAARt = AARt + CAAR^ .i (3) 
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where N = number of firms in the study 
We use t-test to determine the significance of the 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. 
= (ARJ / [S(AR,)/V/D] (4) 
七2 = (CAARJ / [S(ARJ/\/D] (5) 
where D is the number of observations to form CAAR^ and 






The results of this study are summarized in Figure 1 
and Figure 2. Figure 1 measures the abnormal return to 
stockholders of these bidding firms in each of 60 days (44 
trading days) relative to the day of announcement of 
takeover. It shows that the abnormal returns based on both 
value-weighted and equally-weighted market returns vary 
around zero over the period. Before the announcement date, 
there are larger proportion of abnormal returns over the 
time which show positive values especially from the trading 
days from -18 to -14. The cumulative abnormal return based 
on equally-weighted market (value-weighted market) return 
for this period is 3.228% (3.459%). The gradient is 0.646 
(0.692) • That is why the cumulative abnormal returns shown 
in Figure 2 increase sharply during the period from days -
18 to -14. 
During the period from days -13 to -2, the abnormal 
returns appear to fluctuate randomly around zero over the 
period. Thus, the cumulative abnormal return based on 
equally-weighted market (value-weighted market) return for 
this period is -0.335% (0.339%). The gradient is -0.028 
(0.028) . It can be seen in Figure 2 that the slopes of 








































































































































































































































































































During the period from days -1 to 0, there are highly 
positive abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal return 
for equally weighted market (value-weighted market) 
accounting for this period is 2.064% (1.951%) while the 
gradient is 1.032 (0.976). For this period, there are 
relatively large abnormal return earned by stockholders of 
the bidding firms. The average abnormal return for this 
period accounting for equally-weighted market return 
(value-weighted market returns) is 1.032% (0.9755) which is 
11.9 (3.3) times larger than the average abnormal return 
from days -22 to +22. The large relative magnitude of these 
abnormal return can be highlighted in figure 2 where they 
are indicated by the pronounced "spikes" during the period 
from day -1 to day 0. 
During the period from days 1 to 22, the cumulative 
abnormal returns for equally-weighted market (value-
weighted market) is -2.131% (-0.33%). The gradient is 一 
0.097 (-0.015) and so 七 he slope of cumulative abnormal 
returns shown in Figure 2 seems to be a horizontal line but 
slightly in a downward direction. 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 3 and 4 present abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the bidding 
firms over the period from trading days -22 to 22. Over the 
period, only the abnormal return of the announcement day is 
statistically significant. 
Interpretation 
Stock price movement 
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The plots of the abnormal returns (Figure 1) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (Figure 2) give an overall view 
of the abnormal returns to stockholders around the time of 
announcement of takeover. It is not sufficient for detailed 
analysis of the results for the hypothesis testing. In 
order to test the hypothesis whether there is no impact of 
takeovers on the stock return for the bidder firms, we have 
to measure the statistical significance of the cumulative 
abnormal returns to stockholders of bidder firms for 
selected holding periods. The following table presents the 
t-statistics and the cumulative abnormal returns for the 




Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Selected Holding Periods 
HOLDING DAYS IN EQ• WEIGHTED VAL. WEIGHTED 
PERIOD HOLDING CAR T-STAT CAR T-STAT 
PERIOD 
1 t.22 to t-14 4.34% 3.85 4.59% 4.04 
2 t-23 to t-2 -0.34% -0.51 0.34% 0.51 
3 t-i to to 2.06% 1.09 1.95% 1.01 
4 t + i to t+13 -2.23% -3.56 -1.10% -1.78 
5 — t+14 to t+22 0.10% 0.15 0.77% 1.08 
From the table, there is significant positive abnormal 
return in the pre—announcement period 1. There is 4.34% 
( 4 . 5 9 % ) cumulative abnormal returns for equally weighted 
market return (value—market return) with a 七一statistic of 
3.85 (4.04). For the next period, there is negative 
abnormal returns with cumulative negative returns of -0.34% 
(0.34%) and t一statistic of -0.51 (0.51) . At the 
announcement date, there is more than 1% significant 
abnormal returns. The observation from this result is that 
七 he Hong Kong stock market is generally efficient with 
respect to information of takeovers. After the announcement 
date, there is persistent negative abnormal return through 
the post-announcement holding period 4 but there is a 




In our study, the tender offer bid is announced on day 
0 and published in the daily post on day 1. In table 4, 
there is a 2.06% (1.95%) cumulative abnormal return with a 
t一statistic of 1.09 (t=l. 01) earned in period 3 using 
equally weighted market return (value-weighted market 
return). 
This shows that the market reaction to a tender offer 
occurs before the announcement date (t=0)• Excess returns 
occur on the day before announcement to the announcement 
day when the information is known with certainty. We argue 
that this pre-event behaviour is due to the leakage of 
information regarding the impending tender offer. 
Hubris hypothesis 
Hubris hypothesis predicts that there is a stock price 
decline of bidding firms on announcement of a bid. 
However, as argued by Roll (1986), this decrease in price 
may not be completely reflected in a market price decline 
because of contaminating information in a bid. That is, 
when a takeover announcement is made and the bidding itself 
signals a small upward revision in the market's estimate of 
the bidding firm's current assets and this might be not 
completely offset by the prospect of paying too much for 
the target. Moreover, the bid may have been already 
anticipated due to the disclosure either in annual reports, 
or specific announcements to the financial press, or in 
association with other corporate policy changes • 
\ 
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Therefore, the actual returns was in a smaller absolute 
value of an announcement effect than we expected. In 
addition, bidders are usually much larger than targets, the 
effect of a takeover bid may be relatively insignificant in 
a bidding firm and this may be too small to be reliably 
reflected in prices. In our study, over the whole event 
period (day -30 to +30), no significant abnormal returns 
are observed except on the announcement day. 
Mode of payment 
According to the bidder overvaluation hypothesis 
(Myers and Majluf 1984 and Krasker 1986), if the management 
of the bidding firm has superior inside information that 
the existing assets of the firm are overvalued 
(undervalued), they are more likely to undertake a stock-
financed (cash-financed) acquisition. Astute market 
participants, on the other hand, will interpret a stock-
financed (cash-financed) acquisition as a negative 
(positive) news and incorporate this information into 
bidder stock prices along with the estimated value of the 
acquisition. As a result, share price reaction to the 
announcement of a cash financed acquisition will reflect 
both potential gains from the acquisition and the positive 
signalling effect. Moreover, according to wealth 
redistribution hypothesis, a common stock offer may lead to 
wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders, implying 
a fall in stock prices [Eger (1983), Travlos (1987)]. Thus, 
other things being equal, the returns to the shareholders 
29 
of a bidding firm will be higher in cash offer than in a 
common stock exchange offer. Moreover, according to free 
cash flows theory, firms endowed with free cash flows are 
more likely to undertake value decreasing takeovers and if 
the firm undertake a cash offer, it gives out a signal that 
the firm is paying out its cash and the potential risk of 
agency problem is reduced. 
There are a total of thirty bids in our sample. Twenty 
four of them used cash financing, two of them used stock 
financing and another four used a combination of two. As 
mentioned before, since most of the bidding firms in our 
sample used cash financing and there may display more 
positive bidder stock price reactions. 
Number of bidders 
With reference to the Fact Books, there are only two 
hostile takeovers during the period from 1985 to 1992. 
Obviously, such hostile takeovers are not so 
competitive and common in the Hong Kong stock market. 
Besides, multiple bids are rarely observed in Hong Kong. 
Therefore, according to the hypothesis that there is an 
increase in the level of competitiveness resulting in a 
negative impact on the shareholder gains of bidding firms 
(-Roll 1986], the potential gains of bidding firms should 




LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Limitations 
This study includes only the takeovers from 1985 to 
1991, a total of 31 bidding firms are included in the 
sample. The results may be biased due to the small size of 
the sample. Moreover, bidding firms are chosen in the 
sample if they have not been engaged in other takeovers and 
mergers activities in three months period prior to the 
announcement day. It may not be long enough to eliminate 
the effects of other corporate activities on stock 
returns. In addition, our study excludes those suspended 
trading days from the period and therefore, the abnormal 
returns during the event period may be deteriorated by the 
suspended trading. It is because according to the Hong Kong 
code on Takeovers and Mergers, "at the time of announcing 
that a takeover approach has been received, the offeree 
company should seek the suspension of dealing in its shares 
for one full trading day ..." [Hong Kong Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (1987), practical note no.l]. Sometimes, there 
may need to have a suspension of dealings for a period 
greater than one full trading day. In addition, Roll (1986) 
points out that there may be an announcement of intended 
\ 
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入acquisition^ prior to the announcement of a formal 
acquisition. Therefore, our results may also be biased by 
the potential measurement problems. 
Recommendations 
The insignificant gains to bidders revealed in the 
past studies and post outcome abnormal returns for tender 
offers and mergers are almost uniformly negative9 and is 
relatively large in magnitude. Our findings also suggests 
that bidding firms earn insignificant gains from takeovers. 
This leads one to wonder why firms are interested in 
acquiring other firms. However, there are 22 takeovers 
taking place in 1992 and this seems that acquisition 
activities continue to increase. How can we explain the 
phenomenon that managers continue to invest time and their 
companies' resources in making acquisitions? We may need to 
investigate other factors to explain acquisition behaviour. 
This includes an investigation into the agency problem. 
Further studies on the overbidding hypothesis and free cash 
flows hypothesis should be made. We suggest to investigate 
the incentive compensation of managers, monitoring controls 
by board of directors and a test on the second and third 
predictions of hubris hypothesis i.e. a price increase in 
stock price of a bidding firm on abandoning a bid or on 
losing a bid; and a stock price decline of a bidding firm 
8 For details, please see Roll, 1986, 208-209, 
9 Jensen an Ruback, 1983, table 4, 21. 
\ 
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on actually winning a bid. 
\ 
APPENDIX 1 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES (1986-1992) 
Takeovers Merger Reorganiz Demerger Total 
ation 
1 9 8 6 24 2 0 0 26 
1987 29 1 4 1 35 
1988 25 (3) 1 15 0 41 
1989 10 0 0 0 10 
1990 16 2 0 0 18 
1991 15 0 0 0 15 
1992 22 0 0 0 22 
():no. of takeovers which were failed• 
Sources : Fact Books (1986-1992) 
\ 
Appendix 2 
Sample of 31 successful bids 
Target Firm Bidding Firm Announcement 
Date 
1 Hong Kong Electric Hutchison Whampoa 22-Jan-85 
Holdings Ltd. Ltd. _ = L = = = J 
2 Wheelock Marden Wharf Holdings 11-Feb-85 
[The Wharf 
(Holdings) Ltd/] 
3 International City Hutchison Whampoa 5-Oct-85 
Holdings Ltd. Ltd. 
4 International City Hong Kong Electric 5-Oct-85 
Holdings Ltd. Holdings Ltd. 
5 Wing On Bank Hang Seng Bank 19-Dec-85 
6 工mpala Securities 工mpala Pacific 21-Apr-86 
Ltd. Corporation Ltd. 
7 Paliburg Century City 1 7 - M a r - 8 6 
Investment Ltd. Holdings Ltd. 
[Paliburg [Century City 
International International 
Holdings Ltd.] | Holdings Ltd.] 
8 Lane Crawford World 3-Oct-86 
Holdings Ltd. International 
[Lane Crawford (Holdings) Ltd. 
International 
Ltd.] 
9 Kok Tai Century City 21-Jan-87 
Enterprises Ltd. Holdings Ltd. 
[MKI Corporation [Century City 
Ltd.] International 
‘ Holdings Ltd.] 
10 Crocodile Garments Lai Sun Garment 14-Sept-87 
Ltd. Company Ltd. 
[Lai Sun 
Development Co. I Ltd.] 
I 11 II Wah Kwong Asia Securities ll-Sept-87 
properties Ltd. International Ltd. 
12 Local Property Co. Amoy Properties 29-Apr-88 
Ltd• Ltd• 
[Grand Hotel 
Holdings Ltd.] — | _ 
13 Hong Kong Optical Dickson Concepts 20-Jul-88 
Co. Ltd. Ltd. 
[工nnovisions 
Holdings Ltd. ] ================== 
Target Firm Bidding Firm Announcement 
Date 
14 Green Island Cheung Kong 30-Oct-88 
Cement (Holdings) (Holdings) Ltd. 
Ltd. I I 
15 Tek Lee Finance Lee King 24-Nov-88 
and Investment Development Ltd. 
Corporation Ltd. • = = = L = = = = 
16 IBI Asia First Pacific 6-Jan-89 
Company Ltd. . 
17 Singapore Hong Asia Securities 28-Jan-89 
Kong Properties International Ltd. 
Investment Ltd. = ^ = = = = ! = = = = 
18 Kwong Sang Hong Cheung Kong 27-Feb-89 
Ltd. (Holdings) Ltd. 
[Kwong Sang Hong 
International 
Ltd.] 
19 Ontrade Standard-Lloyds 2-Mar-89 
International Ltd. (Holdings) Ltd. 
[Shun Ho , [Shun Ho Resources 
Construction Holdings Ltd.] 
(Holdings) Ltd.] 
20 THL International Blissea Consortium 2 9-May-89 
Ltd. Company Ltd. 
[Seapower [Seabase 
Resources International 
International Holdings Ltd.] 
Ltd•] 
21 Rose Knitting Huey Tai 18-Sept-89 
Company Ltd. Investment Co. 
[Rose Ltd. 
International [Huey Tai 
Ltd ] International 
‘ Ltd.] 
22 I  Polly Peck Far Sun Hung Kai 6-Nov-89 
East Ltd. Properties 
[USI Holdings 
Ltd.] 
23 San Tai Electrical Allied T.W. Ltd. 2-Apr-9 0 
Company Ltd. [Allied Industries 
[Sai Tai International 
Manufacturing Ltd.] 
Ltd.] 
24 Teletech Swilynn ll-Jul-90 
International International 
Holdings Ltd. Holdings Ltd. 
Target Firm Bidding Firm Announcement 
Date 
25 Jademan (Holdings) Sing Tao Holdings 19-Sept-90 
Ltd. Ltd. 
26 E.D. Si F Man Pacific Concord 28-Aug-90 




27 Yu King Holdings Tse Sui Luen 31-Oct-90 
Ltd. Jewellery 
[Bo Shing Real (International) 
Estates Ltd.] Ltd. 
28 Paramount Santai Electrical 12-Nov-90 
Development Ltd. Co. Ltd. 
[Paramount [Santai 
Printing Group Manufacturing 
I  Ltd • ] Ltd •] 




30 Yu King Holdings Emperor Investment 19-Jun-91 
Ltd• Ltd. 
[Bo Shing Real [Emperor 





31 Pacpo Holdings Pacific Concord 30-Dec-91 
Ltd• Holdings Ltd. 
* [ ] is the present name of the company which is confirmed 
by 1992 PACAP. 
\ 
APPENDIX 3 
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS OVER DAYS USING 
T^ QTTAT.T.Y WT^THHTP^n MAPTCTT-T P^ TTTPN.q WTTH HA.qH DTVTDKND EKINVESTED 
Day CAR H 
-22 0.9525% 0.9525% 1» 
-21 -0.1428% 0 . 8097% -CKlOlO 0-5731 
[ -20 0.4196^ 1.2293%' 0.3258 0.9545 
1 -19 ~~ -0.1818"%" 1.0476% -0.1820 1.0487 
-18 0.4509% 1.4984% 0.3058 1,0163 
r -17 一 0.6073% 2 . 1^52% 1.4801 
r -16 一 0.5296% 0.3887 _1_^_9344 
r -15 — 1.Q968V 3.7321% 0.6158 2.0955 
I -14 0.6042%" 4.3363%' 0.5824 
-13 -0.1566% 4.1797^ -0.2061 5.4998 
-12 0.3750% 4.5547% 0.5401 6.5593 
-11, -0.4015% 4.1532% -0.5216 5.3952 
I -10— -0.2514% 3.9017% -0.3889 6.0355 
I -9 -0.2915% 3.6102% -0.9496 11.7599 
1 _8 — 0 . 4 4 5 ^ 4.0557% 0.5106 4.6487 
17 -Q.2187% 3.837^ -0-3584 6.2868 
I -6 -0.5014% 3.3355% - l^llSg- 7.4431 
. -5 0.7250% 4.0606% 1.5785 8,8407 
T -0.3244%-— • 3.7362% -0.7206 8.2998 
T (771100% 3.8462%" 0.2290 8.0083 
r^ ^ 5 4 9 % 4.OQI1V 0-3389 8.7543 
r I T — 0.983^ 4.98^ 1.5270 7.7311 
^ 6.0653% 2.2725 _ _ 
r -0.5906% 5.4747% -1.105Q 10.2428 
^ 寸 -0.0984% 5.3763% -0.2411__13.1722 
r 0.0563% ~ 5.4327%" 0.1235 __11.9136 
" T 5.0098? -1.2778 15.1387 
51 4.9306%" -0.1810 11.2587 
^ r^riTS^" 4.757^ -0.4350 11.9636 
7^ 042：^ 4.7153% -0-0656 7.3178 
^ f T T o ^ — 4.8248% 0-2566 11.3104 
^ ^ ITT^^T^— 4.4496% -0.7724 9.1595 
Yo -n -0-1468 15.7711 
IT 1074378%" 3.9708% -1.2942 11.7396 
O T O O ^ 3.9799% 0.0383 16,8027 
lY r ^ m ^ " 3.8331% -O.399T 10.4267 
~~12.0707 
li" OT3758%" 4.6185% 1.1426 14.0411 
^ -0-9934 16.8569 
4.3964% 0.0944 11.8793 
ri" 3.9443%' -1.4172__12.3622 
^0138%" 3.9580%" Q.0413___11-8806 
^ 3.8662% -0.3263 ___13.7275 
3.9694% 0.2671 10.2681 
I ^ ""““ 3.9336%! -0.3425| 37.6517 
\ 
APPENDIX 4 
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS OVER DAYS USING 
VAT.pi^ WT^TniFT了MAPTTKT P-RTHPN^ WTTH CA.SH DTVTDEND KKTNYESTED 
Day AR CAR ^^ ^ 
— -22 — 0.9 0 7 ^ OT9"O76% " 1.1474 1.147i 
-21 Q.0991% 1.006^ 0.1078 1.0953 
— -20 0.1999% 1.2066%' 
-19 -0.0764% 1.13 02% 
-18 0_^5874%~ 1.717^^ 0.3964 
-17 "O.5129% 2 .2305% 0.3458 j^ .5Q36_ 
-16 0.6014% 2.831^ 0.4377 
-15 0,9981% 3.8299% 0.5467 2.0981 
-14 0.7592厂 4.5891% 0.7604 4.5967 
-13 -Q.0931%" 4.4960% -0.1213 5.8603 
-12 0.4713% 4.9674% 0.6506 6.8571 
“ _ii| -0.2387% 4.7286% -0.2876 5.6958 
TI^ ~Q.1396%~ 4.5890% -0.2300 7.5615 
r^ -0.1240厂 4.4650% -Q.4Q73:一 14.6657 
0.5129% 4.9780% 0.5802 5.6309 
-71 0.0164% 4.9943% 0.0286 8.7371 
-61 -0.4163%— 4 . 5 7 8 ^ -0.9073 9.9768 
r^ ( ^ 6 4 4 6 % 5 . 2 2 2 6 % 1.6280 13,1912 
：“^! 1^2619% • 4.9607% -0.63Q2�11.9382 
T ^ m i ^ 5.0737% 0.2179 9.7824 
17 -0 1454%' 4.9283% 8.7003 
rr ^r^ITT^ 5.7693% 8 • � 0 
^ 一 6,8793%! 14.5995 
r r^rGsTl^"" 6.2282% -1.2217__11-6852 
d 6.4183% 0.4926 __15 . 6392^ 
^ I'O^iiV 6.0195% -1.1739 __17.7192 
H ： " " ^ 0 4 2 5 % 13.4364 
H I^^T^ili? ^.0107% ^^OTO^^^ 14 •4540 
^ d 6.1139% 0.1591 
8— ；^ "^ 043%" 一 6.4182%" 0.7004 14.7729 
^ I T T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 6.0760% -0-7481 ___13.2 822 
^ ；T；^^ "^ 6.1334% ~OT2^___23^7880 
IT ： ^ " ! ! ^ 5.8171%— -0.9611__ 
I T H T ^ 5.7999% -0.07441___坠 0146 
U T^-^inV ^.7815%" -O.Q56d_IV^ZMZ 
— H __l^^liiA 
U 6.4374% 18.6920 
Id 6 
^ r ^ l i H V 6T8l^____lQ^358lL 17.3855 
6.9035% .^^1641___20.1182 
^ I ^ r ^ ^ ^ I 6.5751% ___25.1865 
^ ^ ？TT^^^J" 6.6417% 0.1640 __16.3560 




Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. Strategy and structure. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1962. 
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. The visible hand: The managerial 
revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknapp Press, 1977. 
Securities & Futures Commission. Hong_Kong__Co^__on 
Takeovers and Mergers. , 1990. 
Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and 
antitrust implications• New York, NY: Free Press, 
1975. 
Periodicals 
Ajeyo Banerjee and James E. Owers. "Managerial Incentives 
and Corporate Control Auctions." Managerial__^ 
Decision Economics 14 (1993) 295-309. 
Asquith, P. "Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholders 
return." Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983): 
51-83. 
Bradley, M. , A. Desai and E.H. Kim. "The rationale for 
interim tender offers: Information or synergy? 
Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983):121-139. 
Deepak K. Datta and George E. Pinches. "Factors 
influencing wealth creation from mergers and 
acquisitions: A meta-analysis." Strategic Management 
Journal 13 (1992): 67-84. 
Dodd, Peter. "Merger proposals, management 
一 • _ 
stockholder wealth." Journal of Financial Economics 8 
(1980): 105-138• 
Dodd, Peter and Richard Ruback. "Tender offers and 
stockholder returns: An empirical analysis." Journal 
of Financial Economics 5 (1977): 351-374. 
Eckbo E. "Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder 
, ” .Tournal of Financial Economics 11 (1983) :241-
273 . 
Eger, C. "An empirical test of the redistribution effect in 
\ 
pure exchange mergers•“ Journal of Financial_and 
Quantitative Analysis 18 (1983): 541-572. 
Ellert, J.C. "Mergers, antitrust law enforcement and 
stockholder returns.“ Journal of Finance 31 (1976): 
715-732. 
Firth, M. "Takeovers, shareholder returns and the theory of 
the firm.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics March 
(1980):235-260. 
Jarrell, G. , J. Brickley and J. Netter. "The market for 
corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988): 49-68. 
Jarrell, G. and Poulsen B. "Bidders Returns•” working paper 
(1987a). 
Jensen, Michael C. "Agency costs of free cash flow, 
corporate finance, and the market for takeovers. 
American Economic Review 76 (1988):323-329. 
Jensen, M. and R. Ruback. "The market for corporate 
control: The scientific evidence." Journal__of 
Financial Economics 11 (1983): 5-50. 
Krasker, W. "Stock price movements in response to stock 
issue under asymmetric information." Journal_of 
Finance 41 (1986) :93-105• 
Langetieg, T. "An application of a three-factor performance 
index measure stockholders gains from merger•“ Journal 
of Finanr-.ial Economics 6 (1978) : 365-384. 
Larry H.P. Lang and Rene' M. Stulz and Ralph A. Walking. "A 
test of the free cash flow hypothesis. Journal of 
Financial Economics 29 (1991):351-335. 
Lewellen W.G. and B. Huntsman. "Managerial Pay and 
Corporate Performance." American Economic Review (Sept 
1970): 710-720. 
Li腿ack R.J. "Bidder Companies and Defended Bids: A Test of 
Roll's Hubris Hypothesis." Managerial Finance 19 1 
(1993). 
Mandelker, Gershon. "Risk and return: The case ^ f merging 
firms." .Tnurnal of Financial Economics 1 (1974).303-
335. 
Mueller D.C. "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (Nov 1969):643-659. 
Myers, Stewart C. and N.S. Majluf. "Corporate financing and 
investment decisions when firms have information that 
investors do no七 have." Journal of Financial Economics 
13 (1984):187-222. 
\ 
Roll, R. "The Hubris hypothesis of corporate takeover." 
Journal of Business 59 (1986):197-216. 
Williamson, Oliver E. "The modern corporation: Origins' 
evolution, attributes.“ Journal of Economic T.iterature 
19 (1981)：1537-1568. 
Stillmen, Robert. "Examining antitrust policy toward 
horizontal mergers." Journal of Financial Economics 11 
(1983). 
Travlos, N. "Corporate takeover bids, methods of payments 
and bidding firms' stock returns.“ Journal of Finance 
42 (1987)： 943-964• 
Varaiya, N. P. "An empirical investigation of the biddii^ ig 
firm's gains from corporate takeover." Research__in 

































 .  ,  .  一
•
 .  .-  ,  —  •  .-J...  -  A  .  J  . r  .一  .  •  •  二，  -‘； 
.  . .  , , . . .  .  .  7 . — ： - . -
,  -  .  I  ：  .  .  .  .  .
)
 ？  •  •
.
 ,-,  , 
、.
.












































I  -  .  .
F 
r  i 














































 -  :、n
 
.  .,  V
:

















 r  ^  r  J  c  ^  .  1 
N . 丨 ， 
• ‘ 
‘ ‘ r . 
\ 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
mmmiM ‘ 
Q003Tt.6bO 
• I ‘ 
